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ABOUT ZWORD

Z Word is an online journal focusing on the contemporary debate over Zionism, anti-Zionism, antisemitism and related areas. Editorially independent, Z Word identifies and challenges anti-Zionist orthodoxies in mainstream political exchange.

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ESSAY

Jewish Anti-Zionism Unravelled, Part One: The Morality of Vanity

By Anthony Julius

March 2008




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CONTEMPORARY JEWISH ANTI-ZIONISM is most generously to be interpreted as occupying a position, or a set of positions, within a new Jewish politics. *Modern* Jewish politics was a response to, and an attempt to address, the “Jewish Question;” *contemporary* Jewish politics is a response to, and an attempt to address, the “Israel Question.” Modern Jewish politics emerged out of ideological divisions within Jewish communities in the mid- to late-19th century. The Holocaust brought this politics to an end. Ideological differences within Jewish communities following the Six Day War then caused a *re-emergence* of Jewish politics, which had been dormant for about 40 years.

This shift from the “modern” to the “contemporary” has a complex history.

The Jewish Questions

Towards the end of the 19th century, there was an upsurge in “collective enthusiasms” within the Jewish world,¹ and a break with traditional religious and communal life.² The precipitating events were the 1881 pogroms in Russia, taken by many Jews to confirm the failure of the emancipation project. The divisions within Jewish communities caused by this new, and perhaps clearer-eyed, understanding of their predicament grew over succeeding decades.

Intra-communal conflict reached maximum intensity in the inter-war period of the 20th century. It was, for example, the Jewish sections of the Communist party in revolutionary Russia that led the fight against Zionism; if it were not for these sections, the liquidation of the Zionist movement would have been a slower process.³

“The Jewish Question” was several questions, not just one. Are Jews to be defined as a nation or a religion—and then, what version of Judaism, what kind of Jewish nation? How should Jewish history be understood, and what aspects of it speak to contemporary concerns? Where, how, and with whom should Jews live, “here” in the Diaspora, “there” in Palestine—and with what minority / majority rights and status? In what language or languages should they express themselves as Jews? With what broader political movements, if any, should they ally? From what broader ideologies should they take direction? How should antisemitism be combated—by Jewish solidarity or proletarian solidarity?⁴ A divided, inventive, and almost always struggling Jewish left took every possible position between the polarities of class and nation, revolution and exodus, Lenin and Weizmann, Moscow and Jerusalem. The most refined reasoning (say, Gershom Scholem’s insistence that he was a Zionist, not a Jewish nationalist, or Buber’s insistence that he was a Hebrew Humanist, and not a nationalist)⁵ often emerged in the most desperate of

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circumstances. Though modern Jewish politics was not confined to the Left, it was easy to believe otherwise.

Modern “Jewish politics” took multiple institutional forms. There were Jewish political parties and groups, Jewish “sections” in non-Jewish political parties, philanthropic organisations, labor unions with a predominantly Jewish membership, trade associations, clubs and reading circles, newspapers and journals.⁶ The variety was immense; the level of engagement was intense. In 1920s Poland, for example, there were no less than six socialist Zionist parties;⁷ there were also substantial anti-Zionist

groupings, and a broader anti-, or non-Zionist sentiment, particularly in Western Europe and the United States.

The contending institutions of *contemporary* Jewish politics are radically different. On the one hand, there is the massive fact of the Jewish State. On the other, the political life of Diaspora Jewry is much attenuated—especially in Europe. There are communal bodies, one or two research institutions, some *ad hoc* pressure groups, and there are charities. But that is all. The principal oppositionist bodies that identify themselves as Jewish—in the United Kingdom, “Jews for Justice for Palestinians,” “Independent Jewish Voices,” in America, groups such as “Independent Jewish Voices” and one or two others—are marginal to their community.

The Nazis destroyed the Yiddish-speaking Jewish nation that inhabited parts of Central and Eastern Europe,⁸ and many of the ideological positions taken by those Jews perished with them. The very possibility of Jewish politics suffered an immense blow. Leftists of Jewish origin surrendered their Jewish identity in favor of their Leftist politics; other Jews merely abandoned their Jewish politics and either chose or had forced upon them the consolations of private life, the apolitics of quietism. In the decades immediately following the War, the Jews in the Soviet bloc were prisoners; the Jews of Muslim lands were expelled; the Jews of Israel built their state; the Jews of Western Europe and America reconciled themselves to their good fortune. And then came the Six Day War, and with it, the emergence of a new Jewish politics—a contemporary Jewish politics.

The “Israel Question” is similarly plural. The Six Day War reintroduced the possibility of a Jewish politics by posing the question, what should be done with this newly conquered land? If returned, on what terms, and if retained, by what right? These questions led to still further ones, of a more historical nature. Most concerned the differences and similarities between the 1967 War and the 1948 War. Were they both wars of Jewish survival? Were the Arabs / Palestinians Arabs on both occasions the authors of their own calamity? What were Israel’s peace-making responsibilities in the aftermath of these wars, and did it meet them? And what, indeed, were Israel’s responsibilities towards those unwillingly under its control, and did it meet those responsibilities, too? And still further questions arose. Can Israel be both Jewish and democratic?⁹ What are Diaspora Jewry’s obligations to Israel? And by reference to what (Jewish?) principles

were these obligations to be defined?¹⁰ These questions together constitute a new Jewish politics in the making.¹¹

The character of the contemporary Jewish anti-Zionist

There have always been distinct strands in the Jewish objection to Zionism. It has been regarded as inconsistent with Jewish teaching (the “*religious objection*”), with Jews’ obligations to their countries of citizenship (“*the patriotic objection*”), and with projects of universal emancipation both / either from capitalism (“*the leftist objection*”) and / or ethnic or religious particularism (“*the liberal objection*”).

In the pre-1948 period, every one of these objections counted for a great deal. The religious objection existed in both Orthodox and Reform or Liberal versions. The patriotic objection, which was often advanced in tandem with the religious one, was made by substantial fractions of the Jewish communities of most Western European nations, and of the United States.¹² Indeed, antipathy to Zionism was one of the few positions (according to Michael B. Oren) around which, in the early 1900s, most of American Jewry could rally.¹³ In Germany, meanwhile, in addition to the patriotic objection commanding the unreflective, commonsense allegiance of the generality of the nation’s Jewry it was also given considerable theological depth by the German thinker Herman Cohen (1842-1919).¹⁴ The liberal objection was to the effect that Zionism represented an attempt—no more, actually, than the latest in a series of such attempts in Jewish history—to distance the Western Jew from Western culture.¹⁵ The leftist objection was advanced by both the Third and the Fourth Internationals, that is, the Stalinist and the Trotskyist wings of the revolutionary Communist movement. All these objections faded upon the establishing of the Jewish State, not all at once, but over time. The religious objection was chastened by the ready accommodation reached with the State by the non-Zionist religious parties; the patriotic objection disappeared almost completely, as Jews found it possible to be citizens of their own country while also taking a fond pride in the achievements of another, Israel; the leftist objection faded before the spectacle of the Jewish remnants of the Holocaust rebuilding their lives as they built a state. Non-Zionists became no less ardent for the safety and success of the young State as the Zionists themselves;¹⁶ anti-Zionists tended to keep their own counsel.

And there matters stood until 1967. In the late 1960s, for

a variety of reasons, the leftist objection re-emerged among young Jews who belonged to the New Left. It was thought necessary to “shatter” Zionism to release the revolutionary potential of the Israeli working class; a “dialectical relationship” was perceived between the struggle against Zionism in Israel and the struggle for social revolution within the Arab world.¹⁷ Religious and patriotic objections to Zionism, however, continued to count for nothing. Then, in 1989 or thereabouts, the socialist project was all but abandoned and the radical transformation of society was ruled out of question. And it is at this moment that contemporary Jewish anti-Zionism emerges (though there were early intimations of its emergence in certain positions taken by Diaspora Jews on the 1982 Lebanon War). The leftist objections wither, while the religious objection is revived—though in radically reformulated terms. This new Jewish anti-Zionism inaugurates a return for many Jews to some kind of Jewish identity. They no longer seek, as with previous generations, to relieve themselves of the burden of their Jewish origins; rather, they reassume the burden, in order further to burden their fellow Jews. It is a return conditioned by many factors, of course. It is in part an involuntary response to what is taken to be Israel’s importunacy of people of Jewish descent, it is in part also deliberately

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assumed for its value in the context of pro-Palestinian activism,¹⁸ and last, it is in part the result of a certain post-leftist searching for new allegiances or affiliations.

The reformulation of the religious objection has two aspects. First, it is framed in terms of “justice,” understood to be a distinctly Jewish concept. The Palestinian cause is “just;” Israel’s cause is “unjust.” Second, it is framed in terms of universalist allegiances, similarly understood to be Jewish in character. Let me take these in turn.

First, there is the objection in the name of justice. The “Independent Jewish Voices” (*IJV*) opening statement in 2007, for example, endeavored to “reclaim” the

“tradition of Jewish support for universal freedoms, human rights and social justice.” “Judaism,” it continued, “means nothing if it does not mean social justice.” And Moses’ instruction to Israel was cited, “Justice, justice shall you pursue” (*Deuteronomy* 16:20). This instruction “is a compass bearing for all humanity.”¹⁹ “As a Jew, I feel a particular duty to oppose the injustice that is done to Palestinians,” said one *IJV* signatory.²⁰ “Israel’s actions betray Jewish ethical traditions,” assert a Jewish pro-boycott group.²¹ The anti-Zionist is not just a Jew

“The moraliser makes judgments on others, and profits by so doing; he puts himself on the right side of the fence”

like other Jews; his dissent from normative Zionist loyalties makes him a *better* Jew. He restores Judaism’s good name; to be a good Jew one has to be an anti-Zionist.

The historian Eric Hobsbawm, for example, explained when *IJV* was launched: “It is important for non-Jews to know that there are Jews ... who do not agree with the apparent consensus within the Jewish community that the only good Jew is one who supports Israel.”²² This refusal to “support” Israel leads to the formulation: “Israel is one thing, Jewry another.”²³ So far from Zionism being inextricably implicated in Jewish identity, fidelity to Judaism demands that Israel be criticised and one’s distance from Zionism be affirmed. The public repudiation of the “right of return,” guaranteed to Jews by Israel in one of its earliest pieces of legislation, was considered to be one important such affirmation.²⁴

Second, there is the objection in the name of universalism. The national project has debased the Jewish character by making it ordinary. The true Jew is the universalist—indeed, the one who paradoxically has disavowed all “the trappings of linguistic, religious, and national identity.”²⁵ This contentless “Jewishness” then becomes pure subjectivity.²⁶ Statehood, nationality, race and ethnicity—each one is a false icon. “Jewish particularism” of every kind must be rejected; Jews should not cut themselves off from their fellow students, workmates, and neighbours;²⁷ Jews

should seek a “Jewishness not sealed behind walls of conviction, but open to the infinite possibilities of tomorrow.”²⁸

The ambition is captured in Karl Krauss’s slogan, “Through dissolution to redemption!”²⁹ It must be the Jewish quality to have no qualities at all; assimilation is a “renunciation of characteristics;” Jews are to be distinctive as exemplars of pure humanity.³⁰ Israel is a test of their commitment to a cosmopolitan identity. Once, it was a test of their patriotism; now, it is a test of their freedom from all patriotisms—all loyalties smaller than to an indivisible human race. The only Jewish nationalism that is acceptable is an extranationalism, the only Zionism, a renunciation of Jewish statehood. *IJV*’s principles, one of its founders explained, include “putting human rights first; repudiating all forms of racism; and giving equal priority to Palestinians and Israelis in their quest for a better future.” These are “principles that unite people of goodwill;” “group or ethnic loyalty,” by contrast, is *not* a principle—or not a worthy one, at least.³¹

Contrary to Freud, whose own stance towards Zionism was somewhat reserved,³² but who affirmed “I have never lost the feeling of solidarity with my people,” these Jews play no favorites.³³ Many anti-Zionist Jews do not consider themselves bound by an obligation of loyalty to *any* Jewish project. Indeed, they are not drawn to any such enterprises. Their ties to Israel are at most ones of affection.³⁴

Writing History with Rage

These Jewish anti-Zionists claim to speak as the moral conscience of the Jewish people. They no longer assert, as their revolutionary forebears once did, “We regard ourselves as men, not Jews.”³⁵ Instead, they play the part of scourges of the Jewish State. While the position of scourge can be an honorable one, it is rarely free of difficulty. Many Jewish anti-Zionist scourges find themselves mired in difficulty.

The “scourge” is a kind of moraliser, that is, a public person who prides himself on the ability to discern the good and the evil. The moraliser makes judgments on others, and profits by so doing; he puts himself on the right side of the fence. Moralising provides the moraliser with recognition of his own existence and confirmation of his own value. A moraliser has a good conscience and is satisfied by his own self-righteousness.³⁶ He is not a self-hater; he is enfolded in self-admiration. He is in step with the best opinion.³⁷ He holds that the truth is to be arrived at by

inverting the “us = good” and “other = bad” binarism.³⁸ He finds virtue in opposing his own community; he takes the other point of view.³⁹ He writes counter-histories of his own people. It is not enough for him to disagree, or

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even refute; he must expose the worst bad faith, the most ignoble motives, the grossest crimes. He must *discredit*.

There is thus a quality of rage in much Jewish anti-Zionist writing. Consider, for example, Oren Ben-Dor, an Israeli academic who teaches Legal and Political Philosophy at Southampton University. In his view, the State of Israel should be “reconfigured.” Israel is a “terrorist state like no other” because it “hides [its] primordial immorality [by] foster[ing] an image of victimhood.” “Israel,” he writes, “was created through terror and it needs terror to cover-up its core immorality.” “In 1948, most of the non-Jewish indigenous people were ethnically cleansed from the part of Palestine which became Israel. This action was carefully planned.” Israel has pursued a “successful campaign to silence criticism of its initial and continuing dispossession of the indigenous Palestinians” The Palestinians have “no option but to resort to violent resistance.” “Silence about the immoral core of Israeli statehood makes us all complicit in breeding the terrorism that threatens a catastrophe which could tear the world apart.” “The main problem in Palestine [is] Zionism.” “ Hamas’ voice as a blunt denial of the ‘right of Israel to exist’ has indeed a belligerent tone to it, signalling destruction and annihilation. However, understanding this voice as an ethical cry to the world to not allow Israel the right to persist in its racist self-definition is a much better way of articulating the moral message.” Given these positions, it is perhaps inevitable that Ben-Dor should also maintain “the U.S. is a captive of Zionism.”⁴⁰

The rage is given less histrionic expression in the work of Ilan Pappé, another Israeli who has now made his home at an English university. He has written a book characterising the two-way, mostly forced transfer of populations during the 1947-1948 fighting between Jews and Arabs as a one-

way plan, devised by the Zionist movement in advance of hostilities and executed under cover of war.⁴¹ Surely Mark Lilla is correct when he writes that all political foundings are morally ambiguous enterprises, and that the moral balance-sheet of Israel’s founding, which is still being composed, must be compared to those of other nations at their conception, and not to the behaviour of other nations after their existence was secured.⁴² But such a perspective, scrupulous and nuanced, is not for Pappé. On the contrary,

Every Zionist reference to “transfer” is treated as evidence of the plan; every Zionist disavowal of transfer is treated as an act of dissembling. Every Arab declaration of war against the Jews is treated indulgently, as mere rhetoric; every Arab claim of persecution is accepted without challenge. Every Zionist atrocity is treated as part of their transfer plan; every Arab atrocity is treated as a defensive response to Zionist aggression (or is airbrushed from the history).⁴³ The Palestinian refugees from Israel are represented as the victims of an historic injustice, and the pathos of their unsought and undeserved condition moves Pappé to indignant eloquence; the many hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees from Arab countries, on the other hand, displaced by a combination of coordinated action by the League of Arab States, of state-sanctioned discriminatory and repressive measures, and of popular violence,⁴⁴ barely figure at all in his narratives. The immoderation of Pappé’s thesis, so plainly indifferent to the complexity of the historical record (when indeed it is not positively misrepresented),⁴⁵ invites not so much a refuting response as the dismissive acknowledgment that one is in the presence of a partisan, angered into the traducing

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of the motives and actions of one political movement in advocacy of the interests of its adversary movement.

Jewish anti-Zionist moralisers attract the praise of Israel’s adversaries and enemies;⁴⁶ they are perceived by them to be an admirable, embattled remnant. They are credited with knowing the truth about Israel, the truth



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about Jews. The ex-Israeli Akiva Orr, wrote Tariq Ali admiringly, “had long abandoned Israeli patriotism, but he had been an insider and knew a great deal.”⁴⁷ Ilan Pappé has received the kind of praise usually reserved for dissident truth-tellers in totalitarian societies. This esteem tempts some Jewish anti-Zionists into a certain kind of posturing. It takes “guts” to speak out, says one, the comedian Alexei Sayle.⁴⁸ This “speaking out”—always that, never merely “speaking”—encourages overstatement. A group describing itself as “Jews for Boycotting Israeli Goods” writes “the continuing occupation and exploitation of Palestinian land is a major obstacle to peace for Israelis and Arabs alike *which has global implications for world peace*” (my italics).⁴⁹ Even though *IJV* comprises a group of people with very good access to the public sphere, they lent support to the trope that Jews endeavor to suppress the truth about Israel. They had been “silenced,” they claimed, reduced to muteness by allegations of “disloyalty” or “self-hatred.” Several months after its launch, however, a member of the steering committee resigned, remarking “I’ve become aware how little in touch with the Anglo-Jewish community so many of its people are, when they make the good old Board of Deputies the axis of evil.”⁵⁰

So much for contemporary Jewish anti-Zionism, most broadly conceived. Within it, however, a distinction may be made between the Israeli or ex-Israeli perspective, on the one hand, and the Diaspora Jewish perspective, on the other. It is to this, and other related matters, that the next part of this essay turns.⁵¹ 

- 1 Jonathan Frankel *Prophecy and Politics* (Cambridge, 1984), p. 79.
- 2 Eli Lederhendler *The Road to Modern Jewish Politics* (Oxford, 1989), p. 3. It was “a historical big bang” (*op. cit.*, p. 5). “If political autonomy, social exclusivity and traditional culture defined the parameters of premodern Jewish existence, the transition to what can be called the ‘conditions of modernity’ would necessarily entail the dismantling of all three.” Hillel J. Kieval *Languages of Community* (Berkeley, CA, 2000), p. 26.
- 3 Zvi Gitelman “The Evolution of Soviet Anti-Zionism: From Principle to Pragmatism,” in Robert S. Wistrich, ed., *Anti-Zionism and Antisemitism in the Contemporary World* (New York, 1990), p. 15.
- 4 See Walter Laqueur “Zionism, the Marxist Critique, and the Left,” in Irving Howe and Carl Gershman, eds., *Israel, the Arabs & the Middle East* (New York, 1972), p. 19.
- 5 Lionel Abel *The Intellectual Follies* (New York, 1984), p. 256; Amnon Rubinstein *From Herzl to Rabin* (New York, 2000), pp. 45-46. Buber said this “in the midst of World War II.”
- 6 See Ezra Mendelsohn *On Modern Jewish Politics* (Oxford, 1993), *passim*.
- 7 Ezra Mendelsohn *On Modern Jewish Politics* (Oxford, 1993), p. 65.
- 8 Ezra Mendelsohn *On Modern Jewish Politics* (Oxford, 1993), p. 141.
- 9 A question that has many aspects, both symbolic and practical. For example, Should the words of the national anthem, the *Hatikvah*, be revised (or the anthem itself be rejected in favour of something else)? For a recent discussion, see Adam Lebor “New lyrics for Israel,” *New York Times*, 18 June 2007.
- 10 See Brian Klug “A time to speak out: rethinking Jewish identity and solidarity with Israel,” in Adam Shatz, ed., *Prophets Outcast* (New York, 2004), pp. 378-392.
- 11 Cf.: “Bromberg likens the discussion about Israel to a backed-up swamp full of noxious ideas--from critiques of the Israel lobby to calls for a one-state solution. “All of this is happening because the process has been so stagnant for so long,” he argues, and blames the American Jewish leadership for not openly questioning some of Israel’s decisions. “ Philip Weiss “AIPAC alternative?” *Nation*, 23 April 2007.
- 12 “Zionism, warned the celebrated Reform rabbi Rudolf Grossman in 1897 strikes ‘a fatal blow at the patriotism and loyalty of the Jew to the country under whose protection he lives.’ Congressman Julius Kahn of California, also a member of a Reform congregation, feared that Zionism would expose the American Jew to charges ‘of merely being a sojourner in the United States ...’” Michael B. Oren *Power, Faith and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present* (New York, 2007), p. 351.
- 13 Michael B. Oren *Power, Faith and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present* (New York, 2007), p. 352.
- 14 See Mark Lilla *The Stillborn God* (New York, 2007), pp. 241-242.
- 15 See Sander L. Gilman *Jewish Self-Hatred* (Baltimore, MD, 1986), p. 237.
- 16 “I never loved the idea of a Jewish state. All attempts to separate people on the basis of race or creed or nationality were anathema to my cosmopolitan creed of human fraternity. Still, after the Holocaust ...” Eugene Goodheart “A Non-Zionist reflects on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” *Dissent*, Summer 2007.
- 17 Haim Hanegbi, Moshe Machover, and Akiva Orr, “The Class Nature of Israeli Society,” *New Left Review*, No. 65, January 1971, pp. 12, 26.
- 18 Or it may be both, and then more than either. See Lynne Segal *Making Trouble* (London, 2007), pp. 214-215.
- 19 Brian Klug “Who speaks for Jews in England?” *Guardian*, 5 February 2007.
- 20 Martin Hodgson “British Jews break away from ‘pro-Israeli’ Board of Deputies,” *Independent*, 5 February 2007.
- 21 Letter, *Guardian*, 25 April 2007; letter, *Jewish Chronicle*, 27 April 2007.
- 22 Martin Hodgson “British Jews break away from ‘pro-Israeli’ Board of Deputies,” *Independent*, 5 February 2007.
- 23 Brian Klug “The Myth of the New Antisemitism,” *Nation*, 2 February 2004.
- 24 “We renounce Israeli rights,” *Guardian*, 8 August 2002.
- 25 See Jacqueline Rose “Response to Edward Said,” in Edward W. Said *Freud and the Non-European* (London, 2003), p. 71. Rose describes this as a “striking self-definition of a modern secular Jew.” The “trappings” “stripped away” are the “untenable, most politically dangerous elements.” (But, one wonders, elements of what precisely? A Jewish identity without any Jewish incidents?). Cf.: “My belated identification with Judaism was determined only by those aspects of the national Jewish character that are supra-national in character.” Letter from Margarete von Bendeman-Susman to Martin Buber, 29 March 1921, Nahum N. Glatzer and Paul Mendes-Flohr, eds., *The Letters of Martin Buber* (New York, 1991), p. 257.
- 26 See Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi *Freud’s Moses* (New Haven, CT, 1991), p. 10.
- 27 *Born Jewish* (London, 2005), p. 176.
- 28 Jacqueline Rose, Introduction to Marcel Liebman *Born Jewish* (London, 2005), p. xix.
- 29 “Only a courageous purge of the ranks and the laying aside of the characteristics of a race, which through many centuries of dispersion has long ceased to be a nation, can bring the torment to a stop. Through dissolution to redemption!” See Robert S. Wistrich *The Jews of Vienna in the Age of Franz Joseph* (Oxford, 1990), p. 514.
- 30 See Steven Beller *Vienna and the Jews 1867-1938* (Cambridge, 1989), p. 211. The phrase is Hannah Arendt’s.
- 31 Brian Klug “Climate of the Debate Over Israel,” <http://www.engageonline.org.uk/blog/article.php?id=1003#>.
- 32 See Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi *Freud’s Moses* (New Haven, CT, 1991), pp. 12-14.
- 33 Alain Finkielkraut *The Imaginary Jew* (Lincoln, NA, 1994), p. 136.
- 34 See Brian Klug “A time to speak out: rethinking Jewish identity and solidarity with Israel,” in Adam Shatz, ed., *Prophets Outcast* (New York, 2004), p. 383.
- 35 See Jonathan Frankel *Prophecy and Politics* (Cambridge, 1984), p. 52.
- 36 See Tzvetan Todorov *Hope and Memory: Reflections of the Twentieth Century* (London, 2003), pp. 189, 196.
- 37 “Since the 1970s, Israel has steadily lost support in the world community; it has been increasingly perceived as a conqueror not a victim, as a nation that militarily dominates its region (often ruthlessly) ...” John Docker “Sheer Perversity: Anti-Zionism in the 1940s,” *London Papers in Australian Studies* No. 4,

- Menzies Centre for Australian studies, King's College London, 2001, p. 22. It is taken for granted that this “perception” is correct.
- 38 See Tzvetan Todorov *Hope and Memory: Reflections of the Twentieth Century* (London, 2003), p. 140.
- 39 Cf. Nelson Mandela on Bram Fischer, Afrikaner chairman of the underground Communist Party in South Africa: “I fought only against injustice, not against my own people. Bram showed a level of courage and sacrifice that was in a class of its own.” He died in prison. His Afrikaner guards regarded him as a traitor, persecuting and tormenting him whenever they could. See Martin Meredith “Bram Fischer,” in Alistair Horne, ed., *Telling Lives* (London, 2000), pp. 108, 119.
- 40 See “‘ Hamas’ victory, a new hope?” *The Palestine Chronicle*, 1 February 2006. <http://www.cpcml.ca/Tmld2006/D36012.htm#9>, and “Who are the real terrorists in the Middle East?” *Independent*, 26 July 2006. <http://comment.independent.co.uk/commentators/article1197235.ece>
- 41 *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine* (Oxford, 2006).
- 42 “The End of Politics,” in David Kertzer, ed., *Old Demons, New Debates* (New York, 2005), p. 32.
- 43 See Seth Frantzman “Ethnic cleansing in Palestine?” *Jerusalem Post*, 16 August 2007. For example, Pappé mentions neither the 1929 massacre in Hebron nor the 1948 massacre in Kfar Etzion. Hebron is instead merely referred to as a “biblical Jewish site,” as if it had no *post*-biblical Jewish existence. See *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine* (Oxford, 2006), p. 43. In the 1948 War, 141 local Jews were killed in Kfar Etzion and many others were taken prisoner by the Jordanians, write Idith Zertal and Akiva Eldar, *Lords of the Land* (New York, 2007), p. 5. In addition, thirty-five young soldiers were massacred in February 1948 on their way to rescuing the besieged Etzion Bloc. The exiles from the Bloc had resettled on the Israeli side of the Green Line, but many carried with them the memory of their former home. It is no surprise, then, that the first post-1967 settlement initiatives were undertaken in what had been Kfar Etzion, and in Hebron. See Zertal and Eldar, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-17, 247 and Amnon Rubinstein *From Herzl to Rabin* (New York, 2000), p. 113.
- 44 See Irwin Cotler, David Matas, and Stanley A. Urman, *Jewish Refugees from Arab Countries: The Case for Rights and Redress* (New York, 2007).
- 45 In *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine* (Oxford, 2006), p. 69, Pappé misrepresents a passage from Ben Gurion’s 1948 diaries in several critical respects. Pappé alleges that Ben Gurion “laconically summarised [a] meeting” held on 1-2 January 1948 “by repeating [Yigal] Allon’s words.” Pappé then quotes these “words:” “There is a need now for strong and brutal reaction. We need to be accurate about timing, place and those we hit. If we accuse a family—we need to harm them without mercy, women and children included. Otherwise, this is not an effective reaction. During the operation there is no need to distinguish between guilty and not guilty.” Pappé’s misrepresentations are as follows. *First*, he mistranslates a critical phrase. It is not “If we accuse a family ...,” it is “If we know the family ...” (*im yodim hamishpacha ...*). *Second*, he omits the opening sentences: “There is no question whether or not a reaction [to Arab violence] is essential. The question is only the time and the place. Blowing up a house is insufficient, especially if this is the wrong house.” The context, then, is retaliation. *Third*, Pappé omits the sentence that follows the quoted passage: “In a place where there was no attack—we don’t touch” (*Bemakom sheloh hayta hatkafah—eyn lingoah*) (underlining added). *Fourth*, Pappé misattributes the words to Allon. In fact Ben Gurion records the words as spoken by Gad Machnes. This misattribution is probably not innocent. Allon was by far the more senior figure of the two. See David Ben Gurion *Yoman Hamilchamah: Milchemet Ha’atzmaut 1948-1949* (Tel Aviv, 1982), Vol. 1, pp. 97-98. *Last*, Pappé relies upon Ben Gurion’s summary of Machnes’ remarks, even though a full transcript was available to him in the archives of the Haganah. Efraim Karsh cited it in an article written well before Pappé published his own work. See “Benny Morris and the Reign of Error,” *Middle East Quarterly*, March 1999, Vol. VI, No. 1. According to Karsh, the transcript makes plain that Machnes recommended “a highly discriminate response,” distinguishing between those guilty of violence against the *Yishuv*, and those innocent of violence. I am grateful to Elena Schiff for the research that made this note possible, and for translating the relevant passage from Ben Gurion’s diaries. See also http://camera.org/index.asp?x_context=7&x_issue=21&x_article=1446, which first alerted me to Pappé’s misuse of the Ben Gurion diary entry.
- 46 Even though Zionism—a “settle-state ideology”—has now become hegemonic among the Jews, there are still some among them engaged “in the vanguard, in the struggle for humanity.” See George Galloway *I’m Not the Only One* (London, 2004), pp. 31-33.
- 47 *The Clash of Fundamentalisms* (London, 2003), p. 88. “[Akiva] became something of a guru for many of us aspiring Palestinian and Israeli activists.” Ghada Karmi *In Search of Fatima* (London, 2004), p. 397.
- 48 “I am Jewish, which should make me immune to the charges of antisemitism that fanatical Zionists trot out whenever anybody suggests that Israel’s constant use of torture and ethnic cleansing might be a teensy bit racist and wrong. I say ‘should,’ but of course it won’t. The Zionists have thought up a good psychobabble condemnation for those Jews like myself who think that Israel is merely Serbia with yarmulkes and felafel. They call us ‘self-haters,’ as if our recognition of injustice is somehow a psychological condition. Well, I say better to hate yourself than an entire other people. And it’s bollocks anyway. [...] That great Palestinian Edward Said once said in a speech that those of us who are Jews should confront our co-religionists whenever they show any signs of the unthinking knee-jerk refusal to believe the truth about Israel that even the kindest of them can be prone to. I have never had the guts to do this, but I think if I am chairman of the PLO, then they will get the picture.” “I’ve got what it takes to lead the PLO: Jewish good looks,” *Independent*, 3 October 2000.
- 49 Letter, *Guardian*, 25 April 2007.
- 50 Simon Roker “Voices founder quits ‘out of touch’ group,” *Jewish Chronicle*, 16 November 2007.
- 51 *The unJewish State* (London, 1983), pp. 5-6, 237-238.